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ABSTRACT
The significance of quantum computation for cryptography is discussed. Following
a brief survey of the requirements for quantum computational hardware, an overview of
the ion trap quantum computation project at Los Alamos is presented. The physical
limitations to quantum computation with trapped ions are analyzed and an assessment of
the computational potential of the technology is made.
1.
 
Introduction
Over the past decade information theory has been generalized to include quantum
mechanical systems. (A two-level quantum system has come to be known as a qubit in this
context.) The additional freedom introduced with the quantum mechanical superposition
principle has opened up a variety of capabilities that go well beyond those of conventional
information techniques. For example, quantum cryptography [1, 2] allows two parties to
generate a secret key even in the presence of eavesdropping. But perhaps the most
remarkable capabilities have been predicted in the field of quantum computation,[3, 4]
which has seen tremendous growth since 1994. There are three reasons for this increased
interest: the invention of quantum algorithms with compelling applications to
cryptography; realistic hardware proposals and related experiments; and the development
of quantum error correcting codes. In this paper I shall describe why quantum
computation is now such an active field; why it is experimentally difficult; and the
prospects for quantum computation with trapped ions.
Feynman [3] (see also Benioff [5]) investigated whether quantum mechanics
imposes any intrinsic limitations on conventional computation, and he demonstrated that
reversible Boolean logic could be implemented through quantum mechanical unitary
transformations. However, it was Deutsch [6] who first suggested that by also using non-
Boolean unitary operations the quantum superposition principle could be exploited to
achieve greater computational power than with conventional computation. But it was not
until the work of Shor [7] in 1994 that this “quantum parallelism” was shown to offer an
efficient solution of an interesting computational problem. Building on earlier work of
Simon [8], Shor invented polynomial-time quantum algorithms for solving the integer
factorization and discrete logarithm problems.[7] The difficulty of solving these two
problems with conventional computers underlies the security of much of modern public
key cryptography.[9] Shor’s algorithms are sufficiently compelling that the daunting
scientific and technological challenges involved in practical quantum computation are now
worthy of serious experimental study. (Since 1994 other interesting quantum algorithms,
such as Grover’s “database search” algorithm,[10] have been invented, but in this paper I
shall concentrate on the implications of quantum factoring.)
Although experimental quantum computation is in its infancy, there is a very
promising hardware concept using the quantum states of laser-cooled ions in an
2electromagnetic trap.[11] Cirac and Zoller showed that such systems have the necessary
characteristics to perform quantum computation. The relevant coherence times can be
adequately long; mechanisms for performing the quantum logic gate operations exist; and
a high-probability readout method is possible. (For a detailed description see Reference
12.) Several groups, including our own, [13] are now investigating quantum computation
with trapped ions. A single logic operation using a trapped beryllium ion has been
demonstrated.[14] However, even algorithmically simple computations will require the
creation and controlled evolution of entangled quantum states that are far more complex
than have so far been achieved experimentally. It is therefore important to quantify the
extent to which trapped ions could allow the quantum engineering of the complex states
required for quantum computation.[15] Furthermore, by characterizing the way in which
the precision of quantum operations depends on experimental parameters, it will be
possible to determine how quantum error correction schemes and fault-tolerant methods
can best be applied. These concepts hold out the prospect of unlimited quantum
computation with imperfect physical implementations, if certain precision thresholds can
be attained.[16]
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the
cryptographic implications of quantum factoring. In Section 3 we describe the Cirac-Zoller
scheme for ion trap quantum computation, and Section 4 is devoted to a description of the
different qubit schemes possible with trapped ions. Sections 5 and 6 contain estimates of
the limits to quantum computation with the two classes of qubits. In Section 7 we
compare the bounds obtained in Sections 4 and 5 with the requirements of quantum
factoring. Finally in Section 8 we present some conclusions.
2.
 
Factoring, Public Key Cryptography and Quantum Computation
Every integer can be uniquely decomposed into a product of prime numbers. Most
integers are easy to factor because they are products of small primes, but large integers
(hundreds of digits in length) that are products of two, distinct, comparably-sized primes
can be very difficult to factor with conventional computers.[17] For example, in 1994 the
129-digit number known as RSA129 [18] required 5,000 MIPS-years of computer time
over an 8-month period, using more than 1,000 workstations, to determine its 64-digit and
65-digit prime factors.[19] (By convention one MIPS-year is about 3x1013 instructions.
Current workstations are rated at 200 –800 MIPS.) The perceived difficulty of factoring
with conventional computers underlies the security of widely-used public key
cryptosystems. It is often necessary to ensure that encrypted information remains secure
for decades, but when encrypted information is transmitted we must assume that it can be
monitored and saved for future analysis by eavesdroppers. A quantum computer (QC)
using Shor's algorithm at a clock speed of 100 MHz would have factored RSA129 in only
a few seconds. So the possibility that quantum computers could become feasible is not just
a potential challenge to the use of public key cryptography in the future, but is a concern
for the use of these cryptosystems today.
The RSA cryptosystem, [20] is based on the following computationally difficult
problem:
3RSA problem: Given an integer N that is a product of two distinct primes, p and q, an
integer e such that g.c.d.(e, (p – 1)(q – 1)) = 1, and an integer C, find the integer M such
that , C = Me mod N.
(Here “g.c.d” denotes “greatest common divisor,” and “mod N” indicates that arithmetic is
being performed modulo N. Solving this problem is conjectured to be equivalent to
factoring.)
To understand the significance of the RSA problem we first introduce Euler’s
totient function, which for an integer m is defined as,
φ(m) = number of integers less than m that are relatively prime to m. (1)
Thus, for a prime, p, φ(p) = (p – 1), and for composite moduli of the form, N = p.q,
introduced above we have,
φ(N) = (p – 1)(q – 1)    . (2)
We will also need the following theorem of Euler, which states that for any integer x,
relatively prime to m, i.e. g.c.d.(x, m) = 1,
x 
φ(m)
 = 1 mod m    . (3)
Therefore, we can solve the RSA problem if we can find the integer d defined by
d = e φ(φ(N)) - 1 mod φ(N)    , (4)
because then
Cd = Med = M kφ(N) + 1 = M mod N    , (5)
by Euler’s theorem, Eq.(3), for some integer k.[21] Clearly, if we know φ(N) we can find
the integer d, and we can determine φ(N) if we know the factors, p and q, of N. Thus the
RSA problem can be solved if we can factor the modulus N, which as we will see is
computationally hard.
In the RSA cryptosystem the above problem is used to provide cryptographic
security as follows. Alice wishes to send a (plaintext) message M (a large integer) to Bob,
but wants to be sure that the eavesdropper Eve cannot read the message. So:
a) Bob generates two large, distinct (secret) primes, p and q;
b) He computes their product, N, and the integer φ(N);
c) Bob selects an integer e, such that g.c.d.(e, φ(N)) = 1, and computes the integer d as
above;
d) Bob publishes his public key, comprised of the modulus N and encrypting exponent, e,
but keeps his private key (decrypting exponent) d (as well as p and q) secret;
e) Alice uses Bob’s public key to compute the ciphertext C = Me mod N , and sends C to
Bob;
f) Bob recovers Alice’s message, M, using his secret decrypting exponent, d, as above.
We must assume that Eve passively monitors Alice’s transmission, but if Eve wants to
decrypt Alice’s communication she is faced with the computationally hard problem of
factoring Bob’s modulus, N. Alice and Bob may wish to be sure that their communication
will remain secret for many years, even decades, so they must assess how much
4computational power Eve could apply to factoring the modulus N, not just today but for
many years into the future.
One way to factor N would be to perform trial divisions by all primes less than
N1/2. However, this would require O(exp[l]) divisions, where l is the number of bits in the
binary representation of N, and so the amount of computational work required would
grow exponentially with the size of the modulus. Modern factoring algorithms (including
Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm) use a different strategy:[22] they search for non-
trivial solutions, y, of Legendre’s conguence,
y2 = 1 mod N    , (6)
from which we have,
(y + 1)(y – 1) = 0 mod N    . (7)
Then the factors of N will be distributed between the two parentheses, and can be found
using
g.c.d.(y ± 1, N) = factor of N    . (8)
The General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) algorithm [23] is the best algorithm is
use today for factoring large integers. It is much more efficient than trial division, with a
sub-exponential run-time growth, O[1.923l1/3(ln(l))2/3], and is well-adapted to distributed
processing. This algorithm was recently used to factor the 130-digit number known as
RSA130 [24] in 500 MIPS-years of computer time. From this result we can estimate the
amount of computer time that would be required to factor (using the GNFS) the much
larger moduli that are used in RSA cryptosystems today.
Size of modulus
(bits)
512 1,024 2,048 4,096
Factoring time
(MIPS-years)
2x104 2x1012 6x1022 3x1036
Table 1: Factoring times in MIPS-years for various moduli using the GNFS.
If we assume that Eve can obtain the dedicated use of 1,000 workstations we can
convert the results of Table 1 into factoring times for various future years. We assume:
that each workstation in 1997 is rated at 200 MIPS; that there are no algorithmic
developments beyond the GNFS; and that in the future Eve uses state of the art systems
with processing powers given by “Moore’s Law.” (The observation that the power of
successive processor generations increases by a factor of two approximately every 18
months is known as “Moore’s law”.)
5Size of modulus
(bits)
1,024 2,048 4,096
Factoring time
in 1997
107 years 3x1017 years 2x1031 years
Factoring time
in 2006
105 years 5x1015 years 3x1029 years
Factoring time
in 2015
2,500 years 7x1013 years 4x1027 years
Factoring time
in 2024
38 years 1012 years 7x1025 years
Factoring time
in 2033
7 months 2x1010 years 1024 years
Factoring time
in 2042
3 days 3x108 years 2x1022 years
Table 2: Projected future factoring times using the GNFS for various moduli using 1,000
workstations.
We see from Table 2 that 1,024-bit moduli are probably inadequate for information
that must remain secure for three decades or more. However, because of the exponential
growth of the factoring time, moduli that have only twice as many bits provide ample
protection for data that must be safe for more than four decades, in spite of the assumed
exponential growth of processor power. But if Eve should develop a quantum computer
even larger moduli would be inadequate.
To factor an l-bit integer, N, Shor's quantum factoring algorithm requires a
classical integer, x, that is relatively prime to N, and the computation of the period of the
function [25]
f(a) = xa mod N,     a =0,1, ... N2-1    . (9)
From the period of this function the order, r, of x can be determined. The order is the
smallest integer, r, for which
x
r
 = 1 mod N    . (10)
If this order is even, the congruence
(xr/2-1)(xr/2+1)=0 mod N    , (11)
can be used to factor N as described above.
Shor’s algorithm therefore requires one 2l-bit register to hold the argument of the
function, f; an l-bit register to hold the function values, and some additional memory to
allow reversible computation of the function. (The computation of the quantum Fourier
transform to determine the order, r, involves an insignificant number of quantum gate
operations in comparison with the computation of the function f.)
The amount of additional memory and number of quantum logic gates is somewhat
dependent on the specific implementation of the algorithm,[26] but in our recent improved
version[27] Eve would need a QC with L qubits of memory and ng quantum logic
operations, with
6L = 5l + 4
ng = 25l3 + O(l2) (12)
to factor an l-bit modulus. In contrast to the (sub)exponential run-time growth of the
classical GNFS factoring algorithm, the quantum algorithm has a dramatically slower,
polynomial, O(l3), growth. (The l3-dependence can be understood as arising from the
(conditional) multiplication of 2l classical l-bit integers to build the function, f. Each of the
multiplications requires O(l2) bit-additions (using "elementary school" multiplication) that
can be reduced to elementary quantum logic operations.) If we assume a nominal clock
speed of 100 MHz for Eve’s QC we obtain the following quantum factoring times:
Size of modulus
(bits)
512 1,024 2,048 4,096
Quantum
memory
(qubits)
2,564 5,124 10,244 20,484
Number of
quantum gates
3x109 3x1010 2x1011 2x1012
Quantum
factoring time
33 seconds 4.5 minutes 36 minutes 4.8 hours
Table 3: Quantum factoring times of various moduli on a hypothetical 100-MHz QC.
The quantum factoring algorithm used for these estimates is not optimized and
significant improvements are possible. Nevertheless, we see from Table 3 that even 4,096-
bit moduli would provide inadequate security against this hypothetical QC. Moreover,
because of the slow polynomial growth of the quantum factoring algorithm’s run-time,
Alice and Bob cannot easily ensure security against possible future quantum attacks by
making modest increases in the size of the modulus: they would need exponentially larger
moduli. (For a 20-year quantum factoring time the modulus would need to be ~ 100,000
bits long, using our algorithm and Eve’s hypothetical QC. Such large moduli would make
encryption and decryption prohibitively slow.)
From this simple analysis we see that information encrypted with moduli offering
ample security for many decades against conventional factoring attacks would be rendered
retroactively vulnerable to a future quantum attack. However, because of the very large
numbers of qubits and the long coherence times required we cannot yet state that quantum
computation factoring of cryptographically significant integers will ever be possible. But
the possibility that quantum factoring might become feasible in 20 years time (say) should
be a serious concern for public-key cryptography today. Furthermore, we cannot dismiss
quantum computation as a potential factoring threat that will be superceded by
conventional computation with time. Unless a polynomial-time conventional factoring
algorithm is invented, the future exponential growth of conventional processor power is
easily offset by small increases in the size of public key moduli.
Finally we note that the potential power advantage of quantum computation over
conventional does not come from the intrinsic speed of a QC’s logic operations, but is
instead derived from the parallelism afforded by the superposition principle. Indeed, a QC
would have no speed advantages over conventional computers for most “number
7crunching” problems, and so we are unlikely to see a “general purpose” quantum
computer. At present there are only a few types of problem known for which a QC would
be advantageous. Nevertheless, if the only problem that could be solved on a QC was
integer factorization, this would be reason enough to build a one.
3.
 
Quantum Computational Hardware
Quantum algorithms such as quantum factoring can be built up from sequences of
elementary quantum logic operations (“gates”). Because the Schrodinger equation has
time-reversal symmetry, quantum logic must also be reversible. i.e. the input of a logic
operation must be recoverable from the output. It is known that all conventional Boolean
operations can be constructed from three reversible logic operations: NOT, controlled-
NOT (CNOT), and controlled-controlled-NOT (CCNOT).[3] When implemented on
qubits, with each qubit’s Hilbert space having a basis 0 1, , these operations have the
form:
NOT a a
CNOT a b a a b
CCNOT a b c a b a b c
i i i
ij i j i j
ijk i j k i j k
:
:
:
→
→ ⊕
→ ∧ ⊕ 
    (13)
where the subscripts i, j, k denote the qubits being acted upon; “” denotes the logical
XOR operation or addition mod 2; “” is the logical AND operation; and a, b, c = 0 or 1.
However, to realize the advantages of quantum parallelism an operation that creates
superpositions is required, such as
V
i i
i ii
i i i
i i i
 
  
  
, :
cos exp sin
cos exp sin
            
0 2 0 2 1
0 2 1 2 0
→ −
→ − −
    . (14)
Using this operation we can readily see the complexities involved in quantum
computation, because acting on the two-qubit state |0>|0> with the two gate sequence,
CNOT.V, produces an entangled (non-classical) state:
CNOT Vij i i j i j i j. , 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1
1 2   = +−     . (15)
From the foregoing we conclude that there are three essential requirements for
quantum computation hardware. Firstly, it must be possible to prepare multiple qubits,
adequately isolated from interactions with their environment for the duration of
computation, in an addressable form. Secondly, there must be an external drive mechanism
for performing the requisite quantum logic operations, which requires the careful and
precise control of the qubits’ phases. And thirdly, there must be a readout mechanism for
measuring the state of each qubit at the end of the computation. It is clear that it is much
easier to write down a sequence of quantum logic operations than it is to perform them in
the laboratory. Nevertheless, the above conditions can be satisfied with trapped ions.
8(Other quantum computational technologies that are being studied include nuclear
magnetic resonance[28] and cavity quantum electrodynamics.[29])
In an ion trap quantum computer a qubit would comprise two long-lived internal
states, which we shall denote |0> and |1>, of an ion isolated from the environment by the
electromagnetic fields of a linear radio-frequency quadrupole (RFQ) ion trap. Many
different ion species are suitable for quantum computation, and several different qubit
schemes are possible, as we shall see below. For example, at Los Alamos we are
developing an ion-trap quantum-computer experiment using calcium ions, with the
ultimate objective of performing multiple gate operations on a register of several qubits
(and possibly small computations) in order to determine the potential and physical
limitations of this technology.[13] We have chosen calcium ions for the convenience of the
wavelengths required. The heart of our experiment is a linear radio-frequency quadrupole
(RFQ) ion trap with cylindrical geometry in which strong radial confinement is provided
by radio-frequency potentials applied to four "rod" electrodes and axial confinement is
produced by a harmonic electrostatic potential applied by two "end caps."
After Doppler cooling on their 397-nm S-P transition, several calcium ions will
become localized along the ion trap's axis because their recoil energy (from photon
emission) is less than the spacing of the ions' quantum vibrational energy levels in the axial
confining potential. Although localized to distances much smaller than the wavelength of
the cooling radiation, the ions nevertheless undergo small amplitude oscillations. Their
lowest frequency mode is the axial center of mass (CM) motion in which all the ions
oscillate in phase along the trap axis. The frequency of this mode, whose quantum states
will provide a computational "bus," is set by the axial potential. The inter-ion spacing is
determined by the equilibrium between this axial potential, which tends to push the ions
together, and the ions' mutual Coulomb repulsion. For example, with a 200-kHz axial CM
frequency, the inter-ion spacing is on the order of 30 µm. After this first stage of cooling,
the ions form a “quantum register” in which one qubit can be addressed (with a suitable
laser beam) in isolation from its neighbors. We have determined that more than 20 ions
can be held in an optically addressable configuration. However, before quantum
computation can take place, the quantum state of the ions’ CM mode must be prepared in
its quantum ground state.
Because of the long radiative lifetime of the metastable 3D-states (~1 s), the S-D
electric quadrupole transition in calcium ions has such a narrow width that it displays
upper and lower sidebands separated from the central frequency by the CM frequency.
With a laser that has a suitably narrow linewidth, tuned to the lower sideband, an
additional stage of laser cooling (beyond Doppler cooling) can be used to prepare the
"bus" qubit (CM vibrational mode) in its lowest quantum state ("sideband cooling"). On
completion of this stage, the QC would have all qubits in the |0> state, ready for quantum
computation. (This second stage of cooling could also be performed with Raman
transitions.)
The quantum state of the register of ions will then be manipulated by performing
quantum logical gate operations that will be effected by directing a laser beam at individual
ions for prescribed times. The laser-ion interaction will coherently change the state of the
qubit through the phenomenon of Rabi oscillations. (Several different types of transition
are possible.) As we will see below, the CNOT operation can be effected with the help of
9the quantum states of the ions' CM motion to convey quantum information from one ion
to the other.
On completion of the quantum logic operations the result of the quantum
computation can be read out by turning on a laser that drives the transition between the
|0> state and another ionic level that decays rapidly back to |0>. An ion in the |0> state will
then fluoresce, whereas an ion in the |1> state will remain dark. So, by observing which
ions fluoresce and which are dark, a bit value can be obtained. We have recently
succeeded in trapping calcium ions in our ion trap and imaging them with a charge-
coupled device (CCD) camera. This is the first step toward creation of a quantum
register.[13]
4. Trapped ion qubits
In addition to the two states, |0> and |1> comprising each ionic qubit, in an ion
trap QC there is also a computational “bus” qubit formed by the ground, |g>, and first
excited state, |e>, of the ions' CM axial vibrational motion, which is used to perform logic
operations between qubits. By virtue of energy conservation (and possibly other selection
rules) it is possible to perform two types of coherent operations on a qubit, using laser
pulses directed at an ion: on-resonance transitions that change only an ion's internal state
("V" pulses); and red-sideband transitions (detuned from resonance by the CM frequency)
that change both the qubit’s internal state and the CM quantum state ("U" pulses). The V-
pulse Hamiltonian for a particular ion is,
H e eV
i i
= +−

2
1 0 0 1      , (16)
and the U-pulse Hamiltonian is,
H
L
e a e aU
i i
= +−
  
2
1 0 0 1 †     . (17)
Here Ω is the Rabi frequency, φ is the phase of laser drive, η is the Lamb-Dicke parameter
(characterizing the strength of the interaction between the laser and the ions’ oscillations),
L is the number of ions, and a (a†) is the destruction (creation) operator for quanta of the
CM motion, satisfying
a g a g e a a= = =0 1, , ,† †     . (18)
The unitary operations effected by applying these Hamiltonians to the m-th qubit for a
duration given by a parameter θ and phase φ are:
V
ie
iem
m m
i
m
m m
i
m
 
 
 


, :
cos sin
cos sin
        
0 2 0 2 1
1 2 1 2 0
→ −
→ − −
    , (19)
and
U
e e ie g
g g ie em
m m
i
m
m m
i
m
 
 
 


, :
cos sin
cos sin
        
0 2 0 2 1
1 2 1 2 0
→ −
→ − −
    . (20)
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To perform logic operations on the qubits an additional red-detuned operation
involving the transition from |0> to an auxiliary level, |aux>, in each qubit is required, with
Hamiltonian
H
L
e aux a e aux aU
aux i i
= +−
  
2
0 0 †     , (21)
with associated unitary operation Um
aux  , . For example, the controlled-sign-flip (CSF)
operation between two qubits, c and t
CSFct
c t c t
c t c t
c t c t
c t c t
:
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
→
→
→
→ −
    , (22)
can be accomplished with the sequence of three U-pulses of appropriate duration:
CSF U U Uct c t
aux
c=   , , ,0 2 0 0          . (23)
From this operation a CNOT gate can be produced as
CNOT V CSF Vct t ct t=    2 2 2 2, ,       . (24)
The speed of U- and V-pulse transitions is determined by the Rabi frequency, Ω,
which is proportional to the square root of the laser intensity. But the U-pulses are slower
than the V-pulses because they must put the ions' center of mass into motion, which is a
slower process with more ions, and moreover the Lamb-Dicke parameter, η, is less than
one. Because of their slowness (smallness of the coupling) the U-operations are the rate-
limiting quantities to quantum logic operations. It is therefore desirable to drive these
transitions as quickly as possible. However, the laser intensity cannot be made arbitrarily
large, in order to avoid driving a V-transition, for instance. In the following we shall only
count the duration of the U-pulses to the computational time.
There are two classes of candidates for the qubit levels. The first category occurs
in ions such as Hg+, Sr+, Ca+, Ba+ and Yb+ with first excited states that are metastable,
with lifetimes ranging from 0.1 s (Hg+), 0.4s (Sr+), 1s (Ca+); 1 min (Ba+) and even 10 years
(Yb+). A qubit is comprised of an ion's electronic ground (S) state (|0>), and a sublevel
(|1>) of the metastable excited state (a D-state in Hg, Ca or Ba; an F-state in Yb). The
advantage of this scheme is that it requires only a single laser beam to drive the qubit
transitions, which greatly simplifies the optics of ion addressing. However, the
disadvantage of this scheme is that it requires optical frequency stability of the laser drive
that effects coherent transitions between the qubit levels.
Alternative qubit schemes use hyperfine sublevels of an ion's ground state, or even
Zeeman sublevels in a small magnetic field for ions with zero nuclear spin, with transitions
between the qubit levels driven by Raman transitions. The advantages of this type of
scheme are that the qubit states can be much longer-lived than the metastable state qubits;
only radio frequency stability is required (corresponding to the frequency difference
between the sublevels); and there are many more possible choices of ion (Be+, Ca+, Ba+
and Mg+ for example). Disadvantages are that addressing of the qubits is more complex
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owing to the requirement for two laser beams; and the readout is more involved than with
metastable state qubits.
During quantum computation it is essential that a QC evolves through a sequence
of pure quantum states, prescribed by some quantum algorithm. In general there will be
some time scale required for a particular computation, and other time scales characterizing
the processes that lead to the loss of quantum coherence. By estimating these time scales
we can determine if ion trap QCs have the necessary preconditions to allow quantum
computation to be performed, and which systems are most favorable. Furthermore, certain
decoherence mechanisms become more pronounced with larger numbers of qubits, and
there are technological limits to the number of qubits that can be held and addressed.
Therefore, there are also memory (space) limitations to quantum computation, as well as
time limitations, and it will be important to determine how to optimize quantum algorithms
to make best use of the available resources. In our experiment we have determined that
more than 20 ions can be held in a linear configuration and optically addressed with
minimal cross-talk, using available technology.[13]
The various decoherence mechanisms can be separated into two classes:
fundamental or technical. The former are limitations imposed by laws of Nature, such as
the spontaneous emission of a photon from a qubit level, or the breakdown of the two-
level approximation if a qubit transition is driven with excessive laser power. The technical
limits are those imposed by existing experimental techniques, such as the "heating" of the
ions' CM vibrational mode, or the phase stability of the laser driving the qubit transitions.
One might expect that these limitations would become less restrictive as technology
advances.
It is useful to have benchmarks against which computational capacity can be
characterized. We will use two: factoring capacity and error probability per quantum logic
gate. The former is algorithm dependent, but illustrative, whereas the latter allows us to
contrast the physical systems with the error correction threshold estimates for continuous
quantum computation.[16] (However, the threshold numbers have been obtained under
assumptions that may not be applicable to trapped ions. e.g. an error probability per gate
that is independent of the number of qubits.)
5. Metastable state qubits
We shall consider a quantum algorithm that requires L qubits (ions), and n laser
pulses (we count only the slow, U-pulses), each of duration t (a pi-pulse, θ = pi, for
definiteness). Spontaneous emission of just one photon from one of the qubits' |1> states
will destroy the quantum coherence required to complete this computation, so we may set
an upper limit on the computational time, nt, in terms of the spontaneous emission lifetime
of this level, τ0. The specific form of the bound depends on the "average" number of qubits
that will occupy the |1> state during the computation: we choose this proportion to be 2/3;
giving a bound:
nt < 6τ0/L    . (25)
So we see that "more" computation can be performed if the logic gate time, t, can be
reduced. The duration, t, of a pi-pulse is determined by the intensity, I, of the laser field:
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t ~ I -1/2. However, t, cannot be made arbitrarily small. In an earlier paper we showed that t
cannot be smaller than the period of the CM motion, and shorter periods require stronger
axial potentials that push the ions closer together.[15] The shortest possible gate time then
corresponds to a minimum ion spacing of one wavelength of the interrogating laser light.
In this paper we will consider a different mechanism that gives comparable limits: the
breakdown of the two level approximation in intense laser fields, first considered in
Reference 30.
In addition to the two states comprising each qubit, there are other ionic levels
with higher energies than the |1> state that have rapid electric dipole transitions (lifetime
τex) to the ground state, and so if some population is transferred to such states during
computation their rapid decay will destroy quantum coherence. Although the driving laser
frequency is far off-resonance (detuning ∆) from the transition frequency between |0> and
a higher lying (“extraneous”) level, in intense laser fields there will be some probability, P,
of occupying this level, given by
P ex~


2
28
    , (26)
where Ωex is the Rabi frequency for the transition from the ground state, |0>, to the higher
lying, extraneous level. Therefore, the probability of decoherence through this two-level
breakdown is proportional to the laser intensity, I. By requiring that the probability of
photon emission from a third level should be less than one during the computation, we
obtain the following inequality
nt ex
ex


2
28
1
	
<     . (27)
This inequality sets an upper bound on the laser intensity. From the two inequalities (25)
and (27) we obtain the bound
nL
ex
ex<

	




	









	
20 1 2 0
3 2
     , (28)
between an algorithmic quantity (left-hand side) and a physics parameter (right-hand side),
where λ0 is the wavelength of the |0> - |1> transition, and λex is the wavelength of the
transition from the extraneous level to the |0> state. Using "typical" values of τex ~ 10-8s
and ∆ ~ 1015 Hz we see that the value of the right-hand-side of this inequality is ~ η.107,
translating into enough time to perform a very large number (105-106) of logic operations
on tens of qubits. (The Lamb-Dicke parameter, η, for these ions will be ~ 0.01-0.1.)
The inequality (28) suggests that longer wavelength qubit transitions allow more
computation. Indeed, for specific ions we obtain the bounds:
Hg+: nL < η.3x107
Sr+: nL < η.7x107
Ca+: nL < η.1x108
Ba+: nL < η.5x108
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suggesting that Ba+ ions may offer greater computational potential than Hg+ or Ca+.
However, with L ~ 60 qubits the bound (28) in Ba+ corresponds to a computational time
6τ0/L ~ 6 s, whereas technical sources of decoherence such as ion heating and laser phase
stability are likely to limit the computation before this limit is reached. Therefore, Ba+ ions
are not likely to offer any significant computational advantage over Ca+ at present. We
note that when translated into an error probability per gate, the above bounds fail to meet
the threshold precision that has been suggested for quantum error correction to allow
indefinite quantum computation by one to two orders of magnitude.[13]
6. Raman qubits
When qubits are represented by Zeeman or hyperfine sublevels of an ion's ground
state, Raman transitions would be used to drive the computational operations, detuned by
an amount ∆ below some third level (lifetime τ1). The Rabi frequency for Raman
transitions is proportional to the laser field intensity,
Ω ~ I/∆    , (29)
as is the decoherence process of spontaneous emission from the third level,
P ~ I/∆2    . (30)
Hence, the probability of a successful computational result is independent of how quickly
the computation is performed (at least from the perspective of this decoherence
mechanism). Therefore, Raman transitions offer the possibility of completing a
computation before technical decoherence mechanisms, such as ion heating, become
significant. Using similar arguments as in the last section, we can derive the following
inequality for quantum algorithm parameters in terms of the physics parameters for Raman
qubits:
nL1/2 < 8 η τ1 ∆     . (31)
The right-hand side of this inequality has a typical value ~ η.5x105 which is adequate for a
large number of gate operations (~ 106) on tens of qubits. Also, with the same number of
qubits, the error probability per gate is lower for the Raman transitions than with
metastable qubits. Therefore, Raman qubits come closer to the error correction thresholds
than metastable qubits.[13]
It is also possible to express the computational bounds in terms of typical atomic
values of lifetimes, wavelengths etc.[31] However, the bounds obtained this way are
considerably more pessimistic than the ones we obtained above because real ions have
much longer lived metastable levels than is suggested by the atomic unit of electric
quadrupole moment, for instance. Therefore, although indicative of the amount of
computation possible, this approach does not provide an absolute upper bound on
computational capacity in terms of fundamental constants.[32]
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7. Quantum factoring with trapped ions
To translate the above physics bounds on algorithmic quantities into limits on the
size of integer that could be factored, it is necessary to determine the computational space
and time requirements of quantum factoring. Using the values
L = 5l+4
n = 96l3 + O(l2)
(where n is the number of U pulses) in the decoherence bounds above, we obtain the
(algorithm-dependent) factoring limits (η = 0.01):
Hg+: l < 5 bits
Sr+: l < 6 bits
Ca+: l < 6 bits
Ba+: l < 10 bits
Yb+: l < 5 bits
with metastable qubits. (Larger values may be possible with Raman qubits provided a
careful optimization of the parameters is made.) These limits correspond roughly to the
size of computation at which the probability of success has fallen to 1/e. Larger integers
could be factored but with a lower success probability. Certainly, these projections of the
intrinsic factoring capacity of ion trap QCs are insignificant in comparison with the size of
integers that are used in cryptography. Nevertheless, the 6-bit factoring limit with Ca+ ions
(for instance) represents ~ 20,000 U-pulses applied to 34 qubits, taking ~ 0.2 s,
representing ample opportunity for studying practical small-scale quantum computation.
Also, the above limits do not take into account any possible gains from the use of quantum
error correction. We note that the total computational time with metastable qubits is
~6τ0/L, so that it might be possible to reduce the computation time by using an algorithm
with additional qubits but less gate operations.
8. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed the cryptographic significance of quantum
computation. Given the enormous disparity between the current state of the art of
quantum computation experiments and the requirements for quantum factoring of
interesting numbers, it would be easy to dismiss quantum computation as irrelevant for
cryptography. However, as we have seen in Section 2, it is the possibility that quantum
computation might become possible in 20 years time (say) that must be seriously
considered today. Cryptography will therefore be a compelling motivation for quantum
computation research.
We have surveyed the prospects for and limitations to quantum computation with
trapped ions. It is apparent that with existing technology, adequate time scales and
capacity to hold multiple qubits are available to explore quantum computation well beyond
the current state-of-the-art: a single logic operation involving two qubits. These intrinsic
limits (without quantum error correction) only correspond to the factoring of small
integers. However, the numbers of qubits and logic operations involved are huge, and the
gate precision with Raman qubits is close to the error correction thresholds for indefinite
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computation. Ion traps will therefore be a potent method for exploring whether
superpositions and entangled states of large numbers of qubits can be created.
Investigations of the type studied here identify the relevant physics issues that must be
addressed to achieve computational gains. In particular, we note that there has yet to be a
demonstration that more than one ion can be sideband cooled to the vibrational ground
state. Furthermore, the heating mechanisms for this vibrational mode are poorly
understood. [33, 34] Studies of sideband cooling and reheating of multiple ions will
therefore be crucial to the development of ion trap QCs. Once entangled states of three or
more qubits can be constructed it will also be possible to determine whether multiparticle
decoherence mechanisms are consistent with the model that we have used.
We note that ion trap quantum computation offers many advantages to the recently
proposed NMR quantum computation model,[28] as summarized in Reference 35. Ion
trap qubit coherence is limited by spontaneous emission processes whereas NMR qubit
decoherence is thermally dominated (kT>>hν). Ion trap quantum information is
consequently much more robust. Furthermore, gate times in an ion trap QC could be as
short as 1 µs (set by achievable laser intensities, and two-level breakdown), whereas NMR
gate times will typically be ~ 0.1-1 s (set by the strength of spin-spin interactions and the
need to avoid crosstalk with unintended qubits). Readout in an NMR QC is problematic,
with an exponential reduction in magnetization signal with additional qubits, whereas ion
trap QC readout is a robust process independent of the number of qubits involved.
Moreover, an ion trap QC has the advantage that logic operations can be performed
between arbitrary qubits in the register, whereas in NMR only nearest-neighbor operations
are possible. Therefore, computation in an NMR QC would use much of the available
coherence time in moving qubits around the register until they are adjacent to each other.
We estimate that a realistic bound to the computation possible in an NMR QC is about 10
qubits and 100 logic operations. Of these 100 operations many would be used in a typical
computation to move separated qubits until they are adjacent. A more detailed comparison
of ion trap QCs and NMR will be the subject of a forthcoming paper.[36]
Finally, we should expect that many of the technologies now being pursued for
quantum computation will be superceded by even more promising ideas. At present we are
probably entering the “vacuum tube” era of this exciting new field.
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